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SCOPE 
Since 1st April 2005, the principal legislation on 
insider dealing and market manipulation is contained in 
the Prevention of Financial Markets Abuse Actl (PFMA). 
This Act has transposed the EU Market Abuse Directive 
(MAD )2 and, in the process swept away the Insider 
Dealing and Market Abuse Offences Act of 19943. The 
paper provides a brief introduction to the development of 
insider dealing and market abuse legislation in Malta. It 
describes aspects of the local and EU background to the 
new Act and reviews some of its significant features. 
INTRODUCTION 
Before 1990, Maltese law had no specific rule on 
insider dealing. Prior to the Malta Stock Exchange Act of 
19904, no formal framework for a stock exchange 
facilitating the buying and selling of securities was 
available. The most one could find were a few patchy and 
ineffective rules in the Civil and Criminal codes and some 
very basic corporate governance rules in the then 
Commercial Partnerships Ordinance. With the advent of 
the Malta Stock Exchange, this had to change. In fact, 
the first definition (and regulation) of insider dealing was 
introduced in Maltese law by the Malta Stock Exchange 
Act. As an exchange relies on the public's trust and 
perception of fair dealing, it is easy to understand why 
insider dealing needed to be suitably tackled in a law 
establishing the Malta Stock Exchange. 
Fifteen years have passed from the adoption of that 
pioneering Act. The 1990 provisions eventually gave way 
to the Insider Dealing Act of 1994. Later, in 2004, Malta 
became a full member of the European Union. This event 
signalled a silent revolution in the way we make and 
~nterpret legislation. Accession has played a very 
Important part in our insider dealing legislation. This 
year, Malta transposed the MAD through the PFMA; 
~nother part of the Acquis which has now became an 
mtegral part of our domestic law. 
1 Act IV of 2005. 
THE TRANSPOSITION EXERCISE 
The now repealed Insider Dealing and Market Abuse 
Offences Act had several short-comings and was not a 
simple law to enforce. Indeed. it failed to lead to any 
prosecution. The Act was revised in 2002 to ensure full 
compatibility with the original EU 1989 Directive on 
insider dealings. This directive has now been repealed. 
Compared to the 1989 Directive, the more recent MAD 
presents a much more complex and ambitious blueprint. 
The older directive now appears simplistic and limited. 
The change mirrors an identifiable shift towards greater 
operational co-operation between member states, deeper 
harmonization of the securities legislation in Europe and 
a determination to clean up and require higher standards 
of conduct from participants in the financial markets. 
Other initiatives in a similar direction are currently 
underway with the recent wholesale revision of the 
Investment Services Directive6, and the recent work on 
the new transparency and prospectus directives? . These 
measures will require further changes to our securities 
laws and regulations in the near future. 
The Insider Dealing Directive of 1989 proved easier to 
transpose because it really was not such a complex 
document. The transposition of the new MAD presented 
a greater challenge. The passage of this directive through 
the various mandatory consultation and debate processes 
within the EU occasioned an impressive number of 
reports and detailed position papers, and the convening 
of many explanatory and drafting seminars and 
meetings. The Directive was adopted several months 
prior to Malta's entry into the EU, and came into force on 
the 12th October 2004. The Maltese transposing law 
came into force on the 1st April 2005, six months after 
the deadline fixed in the directive. Most member states 
have found difficulty to meet their transposition 
obligation. Indeed, a majority of member states missed 
the deadline. At the time of writing, a few member states 
~ Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 january 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) and its implementing measures. 
The then Chapter 375 of the Laws of Malta 4 . 
5 Chapter 345 of the Laws of Malta now designated the Financial Markets Act. 
6 Drrectrve 89/592/EEC coordinating regulations on insider dealing. 
A 0•.~ctive 93/22/EC of I 0 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field (ISO) to be replaced by Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
pn r 004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/61 1/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
repea rng Council Directive 93/22/EEC (MIFID). 7o 
. rrective 2004/1 09/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about 
rssuers whose sec ·r d . . Dire . un res are a mrtted to tradrng on a regulated market and amending Directive 200 1/34/EC (Transparency Directive); 
tot ~ve 2003!7 1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted 
ra rng and amending Directive 200 1/34/EC (Prospectus Directive). 
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still require several months before they can come fully in 
line by adopting the required laws and regulations. 
Generally, therefore, this directive has given member 
states, not excluding Malta, a number of drafting and 
juridical problems in implementing its requirements. 
The transposition exercise in Malta suffered a delay in 
its early stages when it was being completed on the basis 
of amendments to the Insider Dealing and Market Abuse 
Offences Act 1994 as amended in 2002. The Act had only 
been very recently revised and improved and appeared to 
already provide for many of the new 
directive 's requirements. Full 
transposition, it was believed, could be 
achieved through a number of additional 
well-placed amendments. In practice, it 
became progressively more evident that 
the current law did not offer a 
sustainable platform for the substantial 
reforms required by the new directive. A 
complete and faithful transposition of 
the directive would effectively have 
entailed amendments to almost every 
single provision of the Act. In the light 
of this assessment, it was decided that it 
would be simpler and tidier to start 
again from scratch. The Insider Dealing 
and Market Abuse Offences Act was therefore sacrificed 
and has now been substituted in its entirety. It is only 
fair to acknowledge that the 1994 Act had anticipated 
several of the important new requirements of the 
Directive. These include extending legal sanctions also to 
market abuse offencesB; the designation of one single 
regulatory agency for overseeing the relevant rules9 ; 
and a framework allowing the exchange of information 
with overseas regulatorsw. 
The directive's requirement that a single competent 
authority should be designated to have responsibility to 
administer the new rules as required by the Directive was 
already satisfied in the shape of the Malta Financial 
Services Authority (MFSA). Since 2002 the MFSA has 
acted as the single unified regulatory authority for all 
financial services, and is the agency now primarily 
responsible for overseeing the workings of the rules 
governing insider dealing and market abuse. (Before 
2002, that function was exercised by the Malta Stock 
Exchange in its regulatory role.) The general functions 
and powers of the MFSA result from the Malta Financial 
Services Authority Act11 • The MFSA is the competent 
authority for the purposes of the Investment Services Act 
199412 and the Financial Markets Act (FMA) of 199013, 
two very important laws that govern financial markets 
and securities business in Malta. Under these laws, the 
MFSA has been assigned considerable powers to carry 
out investigations and to obtain information. The FMA 
empowers the MFSA to obtain information and records 
from recognized investment exchanges. 
8 Article 9A of the then Chapter 375 (now Article 8 of PFMA). 
9 Article I OA of the then Chapter 375 (now Article 2 of PFMA). 
10 Art icle l OA of the then Chapter 375 (now Article 20 of PFMA). 
11 Chapter 330 of the Laws of Malta. 
12 Chapter 370 of the Laws of Malta. 
13 Chapter 345 of the Laws of Malta, or iginally designated the Malta Stock Exchange Act 
14 Article 36 of Chapter 345. 
15 Chapter 386 of the Laws of Malta. 
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The PFMA is now the most important source of Maltese 
law on insider dealing and market abuse. It will certainly 
be playing the leading role in this area. The Act has by 
itself implemented almost the entirety of the new 
directive. Some important rules are found in other laws, 
including the FMA, which sets out the framework for the 
establishment and supervision of securities and other 
investment exchanges, the appointment of a Listing 
Authority, the issue of Listing Rules, and related matters. 
These two laws have complementary objectives and it is 
therefore no surprise that some parts 
of the FMA have had to be slightly 
revised to bring them in line with the 
new insider dealing and market abuse 
law. 
A particular provision in the FMA 
merits being highlighted. The Act 
establishes a judicial remedy through 
the already established Financial 
Services Tribunal (formerly 
designated the Malta Stock Exchange 
Tribunal). The remedy seeks to 
compensate persons who can prove to 
have suffered financial loss as a direct 
result of market manipulation by an 
identified defendant. This mechanism is exceptional and 
can only be availed of where the defendant has already 
been successfully prosecuted criminally14 . If a prior 
conviction has not been secured, the request for damages 
under the FMA provisions would fail. This remedy has 
been available in more or less the same form since the 
coming into force of the 1990 Act and was retained in the 
1994 and 2002 amendments. No proceedings have ever 
been attempted, and this reflects the absence of any 
successful local prosecution for insider dealing or market 
abuse. 
Another unusual feature of the Maltese securities 
regulation architecture concerns the Registry of 
Companies. In fact, the MFSA's wide functions also 
incorporates the Registry of Companies which by 
administering the Companies Act 19951S plays a central 
role in company securities regulation . The Companies 
Act of 1995, another securities-related law, can 
potentially play a significant role in the enforcement of 
insider dealing rules. This Act assigns considerable 
powers of intervention to the Registrar of Companies, 
including the right to seize company records and 
investigate ownership of companies. The Registrar forms 
part of the MFSA structure and the Registry is housed in 
the MFSA premises. This should guarantee a high degree 
of co-ordination. The joint forces of the MFSA and the 
Registrar in accessing and obtaining information are 
considerable. These levels of regulation greatly facilitate 
the detection and investigation of market abuse activities 
and supplement the principles and mechanisms 
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introduced in the new PFMA. 
MAD requires that the regulatory agencies assigned 
responsibility for monitoring market abuses in the 
member states be properly equipped and resourced. This 
will enable them to perform their functions within their 
own jurisdiction and to adequately assist regulators from 
other member states interested in pursuing cross-border 
investigations. Article 12 of the directive therefore 
requires member states to ensure that their respective 
competent authorities have a number of specified powers 
considered essential to detect and punish market abuses. 
These include such new extraordinary powers as freezing 
of funds and the ability to collect telephone records. 
None of the laws mentioned earlier had ever expressly 
granted similar powers. In order to accommodate the 
variety of legal cultures and administrative procedures 
found throughout the recently enlarged European Union 
membership, the directive accepts that these powers may 
be exercised indirectly through the medium of some 
other public authority. This authority may be the 
Attorney General, the Police or the courts. Should a 
member state fail to place its national authority in a 
position to adequately assist other EU regulators in 
combating cross-border cases of market manipulation, it 
may find itself sanctioned for inadequate or incorrect 
transposition of EU law. 
Indeed, intensive cross-border collaboration between 
regulators from different m~mber states is a major pillar 
underlying the EU financial services regulatory 
framework and action plans. It is a major objective 
pursued by Committee of European Securities Regulators 
and its enforcement working group known as CESR-Pol. 
The MAD envisages extensive collaboration between 
regulatory agencies from different member states where 
financial services wrong-doing straddles their borders. 
More generally, EU Directives in this area have 
progressively increased the expected level and quality of 
information-sharing and other forms of supervisory 
assistance between member states. Article 16 of the 
directive returns to this important theme, imposing strict 
obligations of assistance and co-operation which now 
cannot be qualified by such considerations as cost-
sharing or equivalence of confidentiality or regulation. 
The various pieces of legislation which regulate and 
describe the powers of the MFSA already create an 
extensive network of supervisory and investigative 
powers which may be utilized both to tackle domestic 
issues and to assist foreign regulators. Article lOA of the 
Insider Dealing and Market Abuse Offences Act, inserted 
in 2002, had enhanced these powers. The Act already 
allowed the MFSA and the Registrar to co-ordinate their 
efforts, and to exchange information with other 
regulatory and enforcement authorities in Malta and 
overseas. In this way, the requirements of Article 12 and 
16 of the directive had already been adequately catered 
for in the now repealed Act. 
An important issue arising from the directive 
requirement regards 
"administrative measures" . National competent 
authorities are required to put in place these measures in 
order to be able to pursue and punish administratively 
any identified perpetrators of insider trading and market 
abuse offences. Article 14 of the directive requires the 
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introduction of "effective, proportionate and dissuasive" 
administrative sanctions against market abuse offences. 
This article operates "without prejudice to the right of 
member states to impose criminal sanctions". An initial 
reading of the directive may give the impression that a 
member state could choose to punish insider dealing and 
market abuse offences through the workings of criminal 
law, and stop there. The correct reading instead is that 
even though criminal law sanctions are in place, a 
member state is still obliged to adopt appropriate 
administrative measures and sanctions. Prior to the 
PFMA, Maltese law punished these offences very severely 
but only as criminal offences. 
The mandatory introduction of administrative 
measures to deal with the market abuse part of the 
directive has probably caused the most difficulty, not 
only in Malta but also in other EU states. The old law 
only dealt with market abuse offences as criminal 
offences and punished them accordingly. This would not 
be sufficient for the MAD. The clear implication is that 
criminal law sanctions have been deemed insufficient 
(and possibly also inefficient), but member states were 
allowed to decide whether they should also use the 
criminal law. The PFMA chose to retain both 
procedures. Accordingly, the new administrative 
sanction shall now have to co-exist with the criminal 
sanction. 
The problem is that the same wrongdoing or omission 
may now amount both to an administrative 
contravention and to a breach of the criminal law. Once 
it may refer to the same wrong-doing, the risk of overlap 
and the application of the so-called "double jeopardy" 
rule may have to be considered. Article 22(5) of the new 
Act states that the imposition of an administrative 
penalty does not preclude the institution of criminal or 
civil proceedings. It also provides that where in respect 
of a specific act of default, which also amounts to a 
breach of a criminal provision, an administrative fine has 
already been imposed by the competent authority, no 
criminal proceeding may be taken in respect of the same 
act or omission. 
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Another major issue that arises in this context is how 
the law should deal with market abuse offences 
committed by ordinary persons, that is persons who are 
not licence-holders and not directly subject to the normal 
regulatory reach of the supervisory authority. 
(Supervised persons would include stockbrokers and 
directors of listed companies.) The PFMA is now clear 
that even ordinary investors caught abusing the financial 
market may henceforth become subject to administrative 
measures including possible substantial fines. In this 
respect, the PFMA adheres to the directive. Henceforth, 
a person, including a private individual, who deals (buys 
or sells), on a regulated markeF6 is considered an active 
participant in that market and thereby deemed to have 
voluntarily accepted any applicable rules (and sanctions) 
for wrongful acts involved in trades on such markets. 
Some of these rules are now found in the PFMA. The 
16 The Malta Stock Exchange is the only regulated market in Malta. 
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rules and sanctions also apply to 
other persons who, though not 
actually engaging in dealing, may 
have encouraged or advised others to 
do so in an illicit manner, particularly 
on the strength of inside information. 
One can possibly distinguish the 
two forms of sanctions in accordance 
with these respective criteria: 
Administrative fines would be 
characterized: 
- by the relatively smaller amounts 
(only up to LM 40,000 or whatever 
and not including imprisonment), 
- by the role of the Competent 
Authority which alone imposes the 
fine 
- by the possibility of an appeal to the 
Financial Services Tribunal 
- by the non-intervention of the 
Attorney General in the process 
Criminal sanctions would be 
distinguished: 
- by the requirement of the Attorney 
General's approval to authorize 
proceedings 
- by the non-involvement of the 
Competent Authority 
- by the applicability of the criminal 
law, procedure and relative appeals 
- by the possible imposition of much 
higher punishments (up to 
Lm400,ooo and including 
imprisonment) than are foreseen for 
administrative fines 
Another novel requirement of the 
Directive now incorporated in the 
new Act is the duty to report 
suspicious transactions. Clearly 
borrowed from its money-laundering 
precedent, this mechanism is found 
transposed in Article 11. A uniform 
format for such reports is available. 
Article 36 of the FMA had already regulated what a 
recognized investment exchange, like the Malta Stock 
Exchange, should do when it suspects or become aware of 
insider dealing or market abuse. In the PFMA, this 
provision has been broadened and is now subject to a 
formalized procedure. 
The MAD also seeks to increase transparency and early 
disclosure of price-sensitive information. Evidently, the 
chances of insider trading or market abuses are reduced 
if proper and timely disclosure is made by public issuers. 
This places all investors on a level-playing field and 
militates against the dangers of selective or abusive use 
of confidential information. Similar rules founded on the 
same objective are already well-established in the Listing 
Rules issued in terms of the FMA. The new requirements 
-·-- ·-· ----------- --------------- ---
ementing 
current Listing Rules . 
inform the public of insi 
soon as possible was already found 
However new rules have had to 
to satisfy the new rules referr · 
sactions by managers and the n 
"persons who produce 
whopu~ .. v~~ ~~~~ ~~~~·~-v 
fin an cia 
quite b controversy or 
hardship at such information be 
publishe objectively and with such 
verificatio caution that proper journalists are 
expected to take. At this point, it would be interesting to 
dwell briefly on the position of journalists and similar 
media persons under this Act. The word "journalist" has 
been avoided in the drafting as it is devoid of a precise 
legal meaning. The new Act does not attempt to define 
the word "journalists", which in fact is not defined in any 
of our financial legislation. Nor is there a definition in 
our Press Act which is the main legislation to affect the 
work of journalists. As a consequence, one would have to 
look at any issue that may arise on a case by case basis. 
The local problem is compounded by the consideration 
that journalists are not regulated or licensed or 
authorized in any manner. There is no law which 
specifically regulates their profession and there is no 
proper structure for self-regulation. Journalists require 
..--nnl"mnists are 
makes no 
nansJ!;So"':-tJler·e is no doubt that some of 
relevant to persons who may 
and analysis in the media on 
The requirements of Article 13 of the Directive 
imposing professional secrecy are already provided for in 
Maltese law through the Professional Secrecy Act 1994, 
whereas Article 8 which refers to buy-backs had to be 
transposed by special provision. 
Conclusion 
The transposition of MAD has doomed Chapter 375 of 
the Laws of Malta to legal history: another law to fall 
"victim" to Malta's EU membership. It has had a brief, 
historically significant and yet unspectacular existence. 
Indeed, it did not lead to a single prosecution for insider 
dealing (since 1994) or market abuse (since 2002). On 
this ground alone, one cannot describe the 1994 Act as 
having been a success. Its laborious and obtuse drafting 
style may have proved its worst failing. It is not sorely 
missed and is indeed already forgotten. On the other 
hand, it is still too early to judge the effectiveness of the 
recent new 2005 PFMA or to identify its possible 
strengths and weaknesses. 
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